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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD H. WHITE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
JOHN ALI'RED NEWMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I c,., No. 
9038 
I 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
STATEMENT OF ~ACTS 
This action was filed D)' the plaintiff, .Edward H. White, 
against the defendant, John Alfred Newman, for the recovery 
of damages arising from a fire which occurred on the premises 
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On February 22, 19'58, the day of the fire, plaintiff rode 
his motorcycle into defendant's gasoline station located on the 
wrner of 11th East and 17th South in Salt Lake City, L'tah 
(Tr. 3, 4, 17 & 18). He was waited on by one Dan Giatras, 
an employee of defendant (Tr. 4, 17 & 18). Plaintiff's motor-
cycle Was a 1947 Indian, 74 (Tr. 2) and was equipped with 
two gasoline tanks, one on the right side and one on the left 
side, each located directly above and within a few inches of 
the motor (Tr. 4 and 12). The attendant filled the right tank 
first (Tr. 5) and then commenced to fill the left ta'nk which 
held two gallons and was twice as large in capacity as the right 
tank (Tr.) & 18). The motor on plaintiff"s cycle continued 
to run d1,1ring the time the gasoline was being placed in the 
tanks because plaintiff had a diHicult time in starting it (Tr. 
10, 11 & 12). During the process of filling the left tank, plain-
tiff testified that the attendant, Gi.atras, turned his head and 
the gasoline overflowed onto the engine, resulting in a flash 
fire (Tr. 6). According to Giatras, the left tank was not full 
and the air pressure withiri the tank caused the gasoline to 
backflow, and the gasoline thereafter came· into contact with 
the hot motor and manifold, resulting in the flash fire (Tr. 
18, 19 & 20). On cross examination,_ plaintiff said he didn't 
know whether the tank actually overflowed or that it back-
flowed due to air pressure (Tr. 11). 
Plaintiff testified that he was fulh- aware that his motor-
cycle motor and manifold "\ere hot and that he was rather 
fearful that if any ga~ spilled that it could ignite from those 
conditions (Tr. 12 & 13). He was also aware of the dangerous 
potential of gasoline in connection with heat and testified that 
he normally shut the motor off in his automobile while having 
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it hUed with gasoline because of the danger of fire (Tr. 13). 
From the evidence adduced by the defendant, it was apparent 
that when the gasoline backflowed from the left tank, it ran 
down a few inches to the hot motor and manifold, _and then 
ignited (Tr. 19, 20, 21 & 22). 
As to the element of damages' to the motorcycle, plaintiff 
failed to prove the damages with any certainty. He testified 
he had one repair estimate of $333.60, but also said that the 
motorcycle was a total loss and couldn't be repaired (Tr. 9, 
10, 13, 14 & 15). He further testified that he had no opinion 
as to the salvage value of the motorcycle after the fire (Tr. 
14, 15 & 16). The one written estimate of repairs was never 
introduced into evidence and the motorcycle had never been 
repaired (Tr. 10). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the case 
under advisement (Tr. 22), and thereafter granted plaintif£ 
judgment for the sum of $333.60 (R. 36). This judgment was 
based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein 
the court concluded that defendant's attendant was negligent 
and that plaintiff was also negligent, but that it was the heat 
of the manifold rather than a spark from the running motor 
that caused the fire, and plaintiff's negligence did not con-
tribute to the proximate cause of the damage (R .. 14 & 35). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The defendant has designated and included the entire 
record and all of the proceedings and evidence in this action 
and on this appeal relies upon the following points: 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT DEFENDANTS EMPLOYEE WAS NEG-
LIGENT IN ALLOWING GASOLINE TO OVERFLOW 
THE TANK ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTORCYCLE ON THE 
GROUND AND FOR TH b: REASON THAT SUCH IS 
WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POH,."T II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED II\ DENYING THE 
MOTIONS OF THt DEFENDANT FOR A JUDGMENT 
OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY KEGLIGfNT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW AND THAT HE ASSUMED THE 
RISK BY HIS CONDUCT. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE IN ALLOWING THE MO-
TOR TO RUN WHILE THE GAS TANK ON HIS MOTOR-
CYCLE WAS BEING FILLED DID NOT CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAM-
AGE. 
POINT IV-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIH'S MOTORCYCLE WAS DAMAGED II\' THE 
REASONABLE SUM OF $353.60 ON THE GROUND AND 
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FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEE WAS NEG-
LIGENT IN ALLOWING GASOLINE TO OVERFLOW 
THE TANK ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTORCYCLE ON THE 
GROUND AND FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH IS 
WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The only evidence before the court touching on the question 
of whether or not defendant's employee Giatras was negligent 
in the filling of the gasoline tank on plaintiff's motorcycle 
comes from the testimony of plaintiff. On direct examination, 
plaintiff testified that Giatras took the hose out of the right 
tank and put it in the left tank and while filling the latter 
tank, he turned his head and the gas overflowed onto the 
engine resulting in a flash fue. In testifying about this point 
on cross-examination, plaintiff said (Tr. 11): 
By Mr. Bayle: "So you don't know whether it ac-
tually overflowed or that it backflowed due to air in the 
tank, do you? 
Answer: No, I don't." 
Giatras testified that the tank wasn't full and due to the 
air pressure inside of it, the gasoline suddenly was forced out 
and it backilowed, running down onto the hot motor and mani-
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fold (Tr. 18, 19 '& 20). Giatras denied plaintiff's claim that 
he was looking elsewhere aUhe time_of the fire and described 
in detail exactly what happened, thereby discrediting plain-
tiff's claim of what took place (Tr. 19). 
It is well settled that the testimony of a party as a witness 
1n his own behalf is no stronger than that given on cross-
examination. Plaintiff admits that be doesn't ·know whether 
the gasoline being put into the tank actually overflowed ot 
backflowed and accordingly there is no· competent or sub-
stantial evidence in the record from which the trial court 
could find negligence on· the part of defendant's employee. 
It is common knowledge that gasoline has a tendency to back-
flow when being run into a dosed tank. This is due to air 
' pressure being in the tank as was testified to by Giatras (Tr. 
18 & 19). Thus, can it be said under these circumstances that 
it was any more than speculation for the trial court to conclude 
that the gasoline overflowed the tacik and defendant's employee 
was thereby negligent. We recognize_ that if there is any sub-
stantial and competent evidence upon which the court, as 
trier of the facts, acting fairly and reasonably, could make 
such a finding of negligence, that it should not be disturbed 
on appeal. However, this means more than a mere scintilla 
of evidence or that such evidence is entirely speculative in 
nature. 
Under this situation, we respectfully contend that the 
instant case falls within the rule laid down by this Honorable 
Court in Seybold vs. Union Pacific" Ry. Co., 12l Utah 61, 239 
Pac. 2d 174, and in Wyatt vs. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 239 
P 2d 193; and that the finding and conclusions by the t[ial 
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court that defendant's employee was negligent is wholly un-
supported by the evidence. 
POINTS II and III 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT FOR A JUDGMENT 
OF r-:0 CAUSE OF ACTION Or\ THE GROUND THAT 
PLAINTIFf' WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS 
A MA TIER OF LAW AND THAT HE ASSUMED THE 
RISK BY HIS CONDUCT. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IK CONCLUDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE I:"-J" ALLOWING THE MO-
TOR TO RUN WHILE THE GAS TANK ON HIS MOTOR-
CYCLE \VAS BEING FILLED DID NOT CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAM-
AGE. 
We shall now consider the problem of plaintiffs contribu-
tory negligence and if under all of the circumstances, he did 
not assume the risk by requesting defendant's employee to 
Jill the tank on his motorcycl~ while the motor was running. 
It is to be noted that gasoline is highly volatile and will 
readily ignite when in proximity to a spark, flame or extreme 
heat. This Court has held that ir is reasonable to take judicial 
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• 
knowledge of that fact in Vadner vs. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 
45 p 2d 561. 
The evidence in our instant case demonstrates without 
equivocation that plaintiff actually knew and appreciated the 
danger of filling the tanks while the motor was running on 
his motorcycle. The motor was hard to start and that was the 
reason expressed by plaintiff for letting it run while procuring 
the gasoline (Tr. 11 & 12). 
Plaintiff further testified on cross-examination (T r. 12 
& 13): 
"Q. You made no effort to shut the motor off before 
you had the gas line put into it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And that's always your practice, is it not, with this 
particular motorcycle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I think you were aware that this motor was 
hot at the time, weren't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were rather fearful that if any gas did 
spill over that it could ignite from the hot motor, 
weren't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I ,guess you were also aware of the dangers 
potential of ,gasoline in connection with heat? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How about your automobile, did you normally shut 
the automobile olf when you go into the station? 
10 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And why did you do that? 
A. Well, it's dangerous if it backfires; 1t can set the 
car on fire. 
Q. I see; so you wet·e fully aware of this problem at 
the time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the foregoing testimony, it is readily apparent that 
plaintiff possessed a full and complete knowledge of the 
dangerous siluation, even testifying that the reason he shut off 
the motor when having his automobile serviced, was to avoid 
a flash fire due to a spark 1n proximity to the gasoline. Under 
these circwnstances, plaintiff elected to take a chance and by 
doing so, he was grossly careless and negligent. 
In the case of Gust vs. Muskegon Cooperative Oil Co., 
(Michigan) 198 1\'.W. 175, plaintiff had a lighted lantern 
on the floor of her car by her legs, when she ~rove into the 
defendant's gas station. The gas tank was located by the dash· 
board or hood of the car and the pipe receiving the fuel was 
directly over the tank. The plaintiff sat behind the steering 
wheel with the lantern buming while gasoline was being de-
livered to the tank of her car. In making the delivery, the 
defendant's employee was also aware of the burning lantern 
and in the process of filling the tank on plaintiff's car, the 
employee negligently spilled gasoline onto the clothing of the 
plaintiff, and it immediately ignited, severly burning plaintiff. 
The trial court held that plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law and refused to submit the case to the jury. 
On appeal, the Michjgan SUpreme Court had this to say: 
11 
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"The top of the pipe in which the gasolirle was being 
poured into the tank was very dose to the knees of the 
plaintiff as she sat in her car, and the flame in the lan-
tern, which sat at her feet, was not far distant from it 
The danger was so apparent that we cannot but con-
cl~de, as did the trial court, that she s~ould be charged 
With knowledge of it. To hold otherwise, would simply 
put a premium on carelessness in the handling of this 
dangerous liquid." 
In determining whether plaintiff wru; contributorily neg-
ligent as a matter of law, the evidence, and all reawnable 
inferences therefrom, must be viewed m the light most favor-
able to plaintiff. Finlayson vs. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 
491; Mmgus vs. Olsson, I 14 Utah 505, 202 P. 2d 495. 
We respectfully submit that all of the evidence m our 
instant case is overwhelmingly agJinst the plaintiff, and there 
is but one inference to be dwwn therefrom, and that inference 
points unerringly to the negligence of the plaintiff proximately 
contributing to cause his own damages. 
In the Pre-trial Order, the affirmative defense of assump-
tion of risk wJs raised as one of the issues by the defendant 
(R. 8 & 9). \Ve believe that under the circumstances of this 
case the doctrine of assumption of risk is applicable. The 
plaintiff testified as to actual knowledge of the dangerous 
situation and that he knew and appreciated the likelihood of 
gasoline becoming ignited by the conditions of a running motor 
and heat in proximity thereto (T r. 12 & 13). He voluntarily 
exposed himself to the danger by insisting on keeping the 
motor running while gasoline was being put in the tanks 
(Tr. 12). Knowled,ge of the risk is the watchword of assump· 
12 
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tion of risk. By his conduct, plaintiff placed himself squarely 
within the doctrine as defined in 38 Am. Jur. 848, Sec. 173, and 
by Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Vol. 1, page 332, and 
as considered by this Court in Clay vs. Dlmford et al, 121 
Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075. 
The trial court in paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law 
found plaintiff negligent in allowing his motor to run while 
his tank was being filled, but concluded that it was the heat 
of the manifold rather than spark from the motor that caused 
the fire, and that plaintiff's negligence did not contribute to 
the proximate cause of the damage (R. 35). There is no evi-
dence in the record upon which to base such a conclusion. 
The only testimony even remotely touching upon that phase 
of the problem is where plaintiff testified that the widng and 
spark plugs were covered with rubber insulation and that the 
same were contained in a box with a screw down lid. How-
ever, plaintiff further testified that he didn't know wheth~r 
the lid was liquid tight (Tr. 4 & 5). Thus there is no evidence 
as to what actually ignited the gasoline. It could have been 
the heat of the motor, the hot manifold, a spark from the 
exhaust, or a spark from the motor. It is pure speculation. 
However, we fail to see what bearing this has on the problem 
in light of plaintifl's te:.timony that he was fully aware of the 
dangerous situtwn and was actually fearful that if any gasoline 
did spill, that it could ignite (Tr. 12 & 13). 
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of Jaw an<.l 
that because he testified as to having actual knowledge of the 
··dangerous situation, and voluntarily exposed himself and his 
13 
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• 
motorcycle to the ri:.k, he accordingly assumed the risk of 
such conduct and should not be entitled to recover damages 
from the defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTORCYCLE WAS DAMAGED IN THE 
REASONABLE SUM OF $333.60 ON THE GROUND AND 
fOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
We assume the trial court's award of damages in the 
sum of $333.60 is founded upon the written estimate mentioned 
by plaintiff and his counsel in the transcript of testimony (Tr. 
8 & 9). This estimate was never offered or received in evidence 
and no witness was called by plaintiff to prove the rea.~on­
ability of the items aggregating the aforementioned amount. 
The trial court indicated to plaintiff's counsel the incompe· 
tence of this proof without expert testimony (Tr. 7 & 8), and 
we fail to find in the evidence any further proof to support 
the damages ultimately awarded to the plaintiff (Tr. 9, 10, 
14 & 15). 
Another facet of the problem is that plaintiff testified 
from his experience with motorcycles, that this damaged one 
was apparently a total loss and could not be repaired so that 
it would be ridable (Tr. 9). If this in fact be true, the plaintiff's 
true measure of damages would be the reasonable value of 
the motorcycle immediately before the loss or destruction, less 
any salvage value thereof. This Court has declared this to be 
14 
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the rule in Park v:,. Moorman Mfg. Co. et al, 121 Utah 33'1, 
241 P. 2d 914; Hill vs. Varner, 4 Utah 2d 166, 290 P. 2d 448. 
We are unable to ascenain from the ev1dence the theory 
of plaintiffs damages and feel there is no basis established 
in the testimony for the amount awiirded by the trial court. 
This seems so particularly in view of plaintiffs statement that 
he considered the motorcycle to be a total· loss but had no 
idea of the value before the loss, based Upon competent testi· 
many, nor was any salvage value established. 
We respectfully mge that the amount of damages awarded 
by the trial court is unsupported by the evidence and purely 
speculative. 
CONCLliSI0:\1 
\Ve respe,tfully Sltbmit that each-of the foregoing points 
of error is well taken and should be sustained, and that the 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed w1th directmn 
to enter judgment in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff, no cause for action. with co:.ls to appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HL'RD, BAYLE & HURD 
and WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
li05 Contmental Bank Buildmg 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
'5 
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